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Abstract
Electoral forecasting is an ongoing scientific challenge with high social impact, as cur-
rent data-driven methods try to efficiently combine statistics with economic indices and
machine learning. However, recent studies in network science pinpoint towards the im-
portance of temporal characteristics in the diffusion of opinion. As such, we combine
concepts of micro-scale opinion dynamics and temporal epidemics, and develop a novel
macro-scale temporal attenuation (TA) model, which uses pre-election poll data to im-
prove forecasting accuracy. Our hypothesis is that the timing of publicizing opinion polls
plays a significant role in how opinion oscillates, especially right before elections. Thus,
we define the momentum of opinion as a temporal function which bounces up when
opinion is injected in a system of voters, and dampens down during states of relaxation.
We validate TA on survey data from the US Presidential Elections between 1968–2016,
and TA outperforms statistical methods, as well the best pollsters at their time, in 10
out of 13 presidential elections. We present two different implementations of the TA
model, which accumulate an average forecasting error of 2.8–3.28 points over the 48-
year period. Conversely, statistical methods accumulate 7.48 points error, and the best
pollsters accumulate 3.64 points. Overall, TA offers increases of 23-37% in forecasting
performance compared to the state of the art. We show that the effectiveness of TA does
not drop when relatively few polls are available; moreover, with increasing availability
of pre-election surveys, we believe that our TA model will become a reference alongside
other modern election forecasting techniques.
Keywords: election forecast, temporal attenuation, opinion polls, social media, US
Presidential elections, computational intelligence
1. Introduction
Understanding the dynamics of information, which shapes many aspects of our social
lives, is a major research drive in our increasingly networked society [1, 2, 3, 4]. Be it
under the form of a commercial, a rumour, a virus, or a blog post, information diffusion
(or propagation) receives substantial attention from multidisciplinary fields of research
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[5, 6, 7]. Out of these, the ability to predict election outcomes is just one of many areas of
research that sees benefits from cutting-edge investigation techniques, like social media
analysis and data science [8, 9, 10].
Research on forecasting election polls was originally constructed by employing classic
statistical models, applied on opinion polls prior to the election day [11, 12]. Ever since
the late ’70s, it became a scientific fact that correct timing of the election date can be
crucial for the outcome [12]. Election forecasting – especially in the case of presidential
elections – employs so-called macromodels [13]; these are statistical models based on
national economic and political fluctuations. On the other hand, micromodels are models
based on surveys of individual voters during the pre-election period [14]. Current state
of the art in forecasting employs multilevel regression and post-stratification [15, 16, 17]
(MRP). Hence, we mention several reputable institutions in the United States, dedicated
to the analysis of election data using variants of MRP, like Real Clear Politics, Huffington
Post, FiveThirtyEight, Daily Kos, or Understanding America Study. Arching over the
specific methodologies employed by these platforms, we summarize them as follows:
• Poll weighing/averaging – polls from different sources are weighted based on the
pollster credibility.
• Poll adjustment – number of likely voters, convention influence, omission of third
party candidates are taken into account.
• Adding demographic and optional economic data – used to scale surveys at state
and national levels.
• Simulating – using a probabilistic distribution to account for uncertainty in the
data.
Apart from techniques like MRP, we find studies proving that alternative subjective
surveying methods may also be efficient forecasters. Thus, the American National Elec-
tion Surveys from 1956 to 1996 show that voters could themselves better forecast who
will win the presidential elections [14]. Another study shows that quick and unreflective
facial judgments of gubernatorial candidates are more accurate in predicting the winners
than deliberating on the competence of each candidate [18]. In essence, voter forecast-
ing models derived from vote expectations, represent a promising alternative to classic
statistical approaches [19].
Bridging over to social networks and media, there is a scientific debate on how the
wide coverage of publicized opinion polls in media can affect voters before election [20]. It
is already known that social networks have a decisive role in the diffusion of information,
and have proven to be very powerful in many situations involving macroscopic behavior
[21, 8]. Examples include, decisively influencing the Arab Spring in 2010 [22, 23], and
the U.S. presidential elections in 2008 [24], and 2012 [25]. Analyzing the dynamics of
this social layer can offer substantial predictive power over the real-world social networks
they model. Studies on diffusion predictability are further found in marketing and public
relations [7, 26], epidemic spreading[27], hurricane forecasting [28], or forecasting box-
office revenues of movies [29].
Network science proposes understanding diffusion processes by designing interactions
at micro-scale level (i.e., between individual social agents), and forecasting opinion evo-
lution at macro-scale level [30]. Specifically, the macroscopic behavior is inferred by: (i)
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monitoring when social agents become indoctrinated by their neighborhood (i.e., they
adopt information, get infected, buy merchandise [5, 7, 31]), then, (ii) predicting how
cascades of information flow, and how the diffusion process is percolated by individuals.
Nevertheless, temporal aspects are shown to play an essential role in the diffusion of
influence [9, 10], as does the timing of publicizing opinion polls [20] and even organizing
elections [12].
Consequently, this paper builds upon the premises that we are able to extrapolate the
macroscopic behavior of a society (here, in the context of elections) by inferring micro-
scopic temporal dynamic models during the pre-election period. Thus, our contributions
in this paper are:
• We formulate an analytic methodology for modeling the macro-scale evolution of
a multi-opinion system, targeting better election poll forecasting.
• We define an experimental setup, based on pre-election data, to validate the un-
derlying assumptions of our approach.
• We present a comprehensive case study on US Presidential Elections to measure the
efficiency of our approach against state of the art forecasting estimates, including
MRP, as recently used by the best pollsters in the USA.
• We explore the feasibility of applying TA in real time, during an ongoing pre-
election period, and compare its performance to MRP at several points in time,
relative to the election day.
2. The temporal attenuation model
Application of TA starts by gathering a set of pre-election multi-opinion polls with
temporal information, i.e., corresponding to specific relative dates before an election.
Based on the number of candidates for election, we define temporal poll vectors pi(t),
where i is the index of the candidate in the multi-opinion system, and t is the time
(date) of the poll. We define as opinion injection, at any time 0 ≤ t < d, all discrete
observations which stem from the public opinion polls pi(t), preceding the election day
d. We further define a discrete temporal election axis t = [0, d) as being relative to the
date of the first opinion poll (which becomes pi(t = 0)), and the last opinion poll prior
to the election day t = d.
An essential aspect of TA is to reproduce the real-world timing when injecting opinion,
i.e., in this paper, at the level of day, as explained in Figure 1a. As such, we do not
condense consecutive polls, one after another, but scatter them along the temporal axis
in order to model bounces and periods of relaxation mirroring the real-world general
opinion.
Given the available poll vectors pi(t), we construct dataset P consisting of daily
opinion corresponding to each candidate. Since there may be days without available
polls, we compensate every such day 0 < k < d by adding a 0 (no vote) for each
candidate. Consequently, we can describe dataset P and an individual poll vector pi(t)
as:
P = {pi(t = 0), pi(t = 1), ..., pi(t < d)} (1)
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pi(t) =
{
{ p∗0(t)∑ p∗i (t) , ..., p
∗
n(t)∑
p∗i (t)
}, if ∃ poll for t
{0, ..., 0}, otherwise (2)
Equation 1 specifies that P consists of continuous (daily) poll vectors 0 ≤ t < d.
Equation 2 specifies that if a poll is available for a specific day, then we calculate a
normalized opinion value based on the raw poll data p∗ (e.g., number of voters, vote
percentages). In the validation data we have polls ranging from a few hundred to tens
of thousands of voters, so that a normalization of the raw amplitudes is recommended.
2.1. Micro-scale interactions
Most existing micro-scale models for opinion injection rely on fixed thresholds, or
thresholds evolving according to simple probabilistic processes [32, 33, 34], and are im-
pervious to any temporal aspects [35]. Nonetheless, studies applied in epidemiology
propose three popular parametric models for the likelihood of disease transmission rates,
considering time as a parameter [36, 37]: power-law, exponential, and Rayleigh. These
functions model the temporal damping (fading) of infectiousness after exposure, yet, they
may be used to trace the evolution of opinion after each injection.
In this paper, we introduce the power-law (PTA) and exponential (ETA) temporal
attenuated models, and analyze their efficiency. In their continuous epidemiological for-
mulation [37], these models express the transmission likelihood λi(t) of a disease in time,
after a relative time ∆t since an individual i was infected, as expressed by the following
expression: λi(t) = αi ·∆t−βi for PTA, respectively λi(t) = αi · e−∆tβi for ETA.
Additionally, we parameterize the two TA models with an amplitude factor αi and a
damping factor βi, specific for every candidate i. The αi factor determines the amplitude
of the positive bounce when opinion is injected, and the βi factor controls the damping
speed towards the relaxed state (λ(t→∞) = 0) for any candidate (see Figure 1b).
2.1.1. Macro-scale emergent behavior
Based on the introduced temporal micro-scale models, we define the concept of opin-
ion momentum Mi(t). The momentum of each candidate i is an aggregated macro-scale
estimator for the evolution of opinion of the entire voter system. We extrapolate Mi(t)
for PTA and ETA as follows:
Mi(t) =
{
αi(t) · t−βi (PTA)
αi(t) · e−tβi (ETA)
(3)
The amplitude αi evolves according to the following rules: if we are during a relaxation
state, when there is no opinion injection at moment t (i.e., pi(t) = 0), then αi remains
unchanged. Consequently, as we progress on the discrete time axis (t→ t+1), momentum
Mi(t) will decrease. On the other hand, if opinion is injected and we have a poll pi(t) >
0 at the current moment, then αi is increased by an amplitude proportional to the
normalized number of votes pi(t). The evolution in time of αi is given by the following
equation:
αi(t) =
{
αi(t− 1)t−βi + pi(t), if pi(t) > 0
αi(t− 1), if pi(t) = 0
(4)
4
By simulating the evolution of each opinion momentum in time, we can infer the
current opinion Ωi by normalizing the momentums of each candidate i as follows:
Ωi(t) = Mi(t)/
∑
j
Mj(t) (5)
The process of evolving momentums Mi(t) and opinions Ωi(t) is detailed on a proof
of concept voting system in Figure 1. A detailed comparative analysis of TA is further
provided given in Appendix A.
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Figure 1: Overview of the temporal attenuation (TA) model applied on two candidates (C1-blue and
C2-red) receiving an equal number of votes (i.e., suggesting a 50-50% tie) over 6 days before election,
but according to different temporal patterns. (A) Surveys are collected for the two candidates at t =
{2, 3, 5, 6}. From these, set P is assembled consisting of poll vectors p0(t) and p1t. (B) Impact of
damping factor β on a TA function with one spike at t = 2, followed by a continuous relaxation state.
A higher β translates into a more abrupt damping of the momentum. (C) Momentum Mi(t) evolution
for PTA and ETA corresponding to the poll vectors p0(t) and p1(t). Individual votes are displayed in
absolute value on the graphs. The simulation using dataset P corresponds to the pre-election period
(0 < t ≤ 6). (D) Opinion Ωi(t) evolution for PTA and ETA corresponding to the momemtums in panel
(c). Several poll differences are displayed at t = {2, 4, 6} using the color of the virtual winner at that
moment.
2.2. Temporal attenuation algorithm
By corroborating all the introduced terms, we present the flowchart of applying TA
on a pre-election dataset in Figure 2, and provide the supporting algorithmic pseudocode
in Algorithm 1. The required input is a dataset consisting of pre-election polls, where
each poll expresses opinion for each candidate i in the multi-opinion system. The first
stage of the algorithm (data preparation), depicted in Figure 2a, creates the intermediary
dataset P consisting of daily poll vectors pi(t) for each day 0 ≤ t < d. The second stage
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of the algorithm (temporal attenuation), depicted in Figure 2b, computes the momentum
of opinion Mi(t) from P using the amplitude αi(t), damping factor βi, and daily poll
vectors pi(t). The output, represented by the daily opinion evolution Ωi(t), is computed
from each momentum M(t).
Algorithm 1 Electoral forecasting algorithm based on temporal attenuation (TA)
1: Input: Pre-election polls for each candidate i, with timestamp
2: Stage A: Data preparation
3: sort polls by date in increasing order
4: assign first poll’s date as day t← 0
5: assign election date as day t← d
6: assign relative day 0 ≤ t < d for ∀ pre-election poll → pi(t)
7: for each day t ∈ [0, d) assign pi(t) according to Equation 2 → P
8: output: P = {pi(t = 0), pi(t = 1), ..., pi(t < d)}
9: Stage B: Temporal attenuation
10: input: P (Equation 1)
11: compute opinion momentum Mi(t):
12: for ∀ candidate i in the multi-opinion system P do
13: αi(0)← pi(0)
14: for t ∈ [1, d) do
15: if pi(t) > 0 then (Equation 4)
16: αi(t)← αi(t− 1) · t−βi + pi(t)
17: else
18: αi(t)← αi(t− 1)
19: end if
20: Mi(t)← αi(t) · t−β (Equation 3)
21: end for
22: end for
23: compute opinion Ωi(t):
24: for t ∈ [0, d) do
25: Ωi(t) = Mi(t)/
∑
jMj(t) (Equation 5)
26: end for
27: Output: Evolution of daily opinion Ωi(t) towards each candidate i in time 0 ≤ t < d
2.3. Experimental validation
Prediction models, where microscopic interactions are considered, consistently repre-
sent data as information cascades triggered by so-called opinion sources (also spreader
nodes, stubborn agents, vital nodes) [32, 33, 34]. While these interactions are meaningful,
accounting for all of them is still technologically, ethically, and legally impossible (e.g.,
analyzing all tweets posted by all users in the USA before an election). As such, we use
ubiquitous data under the form of pre-election opinion polls, which are centralized and
open, gathered from Real Clear Politics, Understanding America Study, and Daily Kos
(detailed in Methods).
We present a case study on the US presidential elections between 1968–2016 in order
to showcase the superior performance of our TA method. For each election year, we
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Figure 2: Flowchart of applying TA. (A) The data preparation stage takes as input a set of pre-election
polls with timestamp, and produces the daily opinion set of poll vectors P as an intermediary output.
Polls are first sorted by date from first to last, then the first date is assigned as relative day t = 0,
while the election day is assigned as relative day t = d. Each other poll gets assigned a relative day
0 ≤ t < d. P is created by either setting a normalized poll for that day (pi(t)), or, if no poll is available,
an empty poll vector {0, ...0}. (B) The temporal attenuation stage further takes P as input to compute
the momemtum M(t), based on αi(t), βi, and pi(t). Consequently, the daily opinion Ω(t) towards each
candidate is computed as output from M(t).
compare the poll estimates obtained with our PTA and ETA methods, to the statistical
methods of survey averaging (SA), cumulative vote counting (CC) (see Methods for
details), and the best pollster estimations at the respective time.
Given the nature of the US presidential election system, we validate TA on a three
candidate system. We refer to these as the Democratic (D), Republican (R) and ”other”
(O) candidate. The ground truth for forecasting validation represents the actual poll
results from each respective election.
3. Materials and methods
3.1. US Presidential Elections datasets
Data were aggregated from Real Clear Politics (2012a, 2016a), Understanding Amer-
ica Study (2016b), and Daily Kos (1968–2008, 2012b). Table 1 provides information on
all 15 datasets alongside the US presidential election results for the Democratic, Repub-
lican and ”other” candidates between 1968–2016. These values are used as ground truth
for measuring the performance of our TA method. Extended information on the data is
found in Appendix D.
3.2. Alternative poll estimation methods
Cumulative vote counting (CC) is applied by summing up all votes expressed by the
polls p∗i (t) for each candidate i over the total polling period [0, d). Note that for CC we
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Table 1: US presidential election results between 1968–2016 expressed as percentages, the winning
political party (D or R), number of polls in dataset, and pre-election duration (in days).
Dataset D(%) R(%) O(%) Winner Surveys Duration
1968 42.7 43.4 13.9 R 12 140
1972 37.5 60.7 1.8 R 14 140
1976 50.1 48 1.9 D 29 144
1980 41 50.7 8.3 R 25 139
1984 40.6 58.8 0.6 R 32 139
1988 45.6 53.4 1 R 47 138
1992 43 37.4 19.6 D 64 144
1996 49.2 40.7 10.1 D 75 147
2000 48.4 47.9 3.7 D 356 147
2004 48.3 50.7 1 R 150 146
2008 52.9 45.7 1.4 D 188 147
2012a 52.9 45.7 1.4 D 326 1276
2012b 51.1 47.2 1.7 D 114 147
2016a 48.2 46.1 5.7 R 259 529
2016b 48.2 46.1 5.7 R 121 120
do not use the normalized value pi(t), but the absolute number of votes expressed in each
poll p∗i (t). Consequently, we define a cumulative momentum cMi(t) which is updates as:
cMi(t) =
{
cMi(t− 1) + p∗i (t), if pi(t) > 0
cMi(t− 1), if pi(t) = 0
(6)
At the end of the polling period (t = d), each cumulative momentum cMi(t) will store
the total number of votes expressed for each candidate i. At any time, we can infer the
current opinion towards a candidate cΩi(t) by normalizing each momentum:
cΩi(t) = cMi(t)/
∑
j
cMj(t) (7)
Survey averaging (SA) is applied by averaging the normalized poll results over the
entire pre-election period. In order to express opinion sΩi(t) after t elapsed days, we use
the normalized poll vector pi(t) directly:
sΩi(t) =
∑
0≤k≤t pi(k)
|{pi(k)|0 ≤ k ≤ t}| (8)
In Equation 8 we obtain the current poll at time t (expressed as number of days) by
summing up all normalized votes for the period [0, t] and divide by the number (cardinal)
of polls in that same period.
The main distinction between CC and SA is that the first method uses the absolute
number of votes for each candidate, whereas SA uses the normalized poll values.
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3.3. Determining near-optimal amplitude and damping factors
The poll forecasting performance of the TA model depends on choosing the right α and
β factors. As such, we simulate forecasting on all datasets with the following values αi ∈
{0.1, 0.5, 1.0} for amplitude, respectively βi ∈ {0.05, 0.01, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3, 0.4...0.9, 1.0, 1.25, 1.5}
for damping.
For each forecasting simulation, we measure the total error ε expressed as percentage
offset from the final election results. Based on the real results under the form Ω
candidate
year
(given in Table 1), we define the relative estimation error ε as the sum of positive differ-
ences between the estimation error for all three candidates c ∈ {D,R,O}:
εyear(αi, βi) =
∑
c∈{D,R,O}
|Ωcyear − Ωcyear(αi, βi)| (9)
By varying αi only the scale of the momentums Mi(t) changes. Hence, since we
normalize all Mi(t) in order to obtain the poll results Ωi(t), the value of the amplitude
becomes irrelevant. On the other hand, we notice that the impact of βi is significant.
As an example, we display in Figure 3 the evolution of the total error ε for the 2012
and 2016 elections, by employing PTA (violet) and ETA (yellow). Striving for a minimal
error, our results suggest the following ideal βi values: ε
PTA
2012a(α = 1, β = 0.5) = 2.53,
εETA2012a(α = 1, β = 0.2) = 2.55, ε
PTA
2016a(α = 1, β = 0.7) = 1.59, and ε
ETA
2016a(α = 1, β =
0.25) = 1.59.
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Figure 3: Total poll estimation error ε (D+R+O) for the PTA (violet) and ETA (yellow) methods. A
smaller ε is better, and we highlight the corresponding β values with vertical dotted lines.
The same process of finding an ideal combination (α, β) can be repeated for each
dataset. However, choosing an optimal damping factor during a real-time pre-election
period is not plausible because we cannot compute ε without the final, real results.
Therefore, we compute a pseudo-ideal β factor from the average of the best β’s measured
over all past datasets, in the perspective that it should be used for present and future
predictions. As such, all forecasting simulations presented in this paper are based on the
same data-derived damping factor β = 1.1 for PTA, and β = 0.78 for ETA.
4. Results
A good electoral forecasting method should have two qualities: (i) it should produce
poll estimations for all candidates that are – overall – as close as possible to the real
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election results, and (ii) it should correctly determine the winner of the election.
We quantify the first property by the total estimation error ε given as the sum of
positive differences between the estimation error for all candidates (see Equation 9).
A smaller ε translates into a more performant forecasting method. Table 2 displays
ε between each forecasting method and the actual election results. Averaged over all
datasets, we measure a forecasting error of 3.64 points for the best pollster, 7.31 for CC
and 7.49 for SA. The errors of TA are only 3.28 points for PTA and 2.87 points for ETA.
These results translate into a superior performance of TA over all other state of the art
methods. We obtain a 0.364 point improvement for PTA, respectively 0.774 for ETA
compared to the best pollster estimations.
Table 2: Estimation error ε of forecasting methods during the 1968-2016 presidential elections, alongside
the best predictor at that time (name of pollster specified in parenthesis).
Dataset CC SA PTA ETA Best
1968 9.82 9.78 4.15 4.11 4.1 (Gallup)
1972 5.63 5.64 4.02 1.04 1.8 (Gallup)
1976 9.22 8.97 1.56 0.53 0.9 (Roper)
1980 12.35 15.18 7.02 6.71 6.7 (Gallup)
1984 7.17 7.66 3.4 2.42 2.4 (Gallup)
1988 8.32 8.1 7.32 7.33 11.0 (CBS/NYT)
1992 6.52 5.18 1.06 1.68 3.4 (CBS/NYT)
1996 6.95 6.75 3.04 2.64 3.1 (Gallup)
2000 6.43 8.13 2.54 2.35 2.4 (IBD/CSM)
2004 7.18 6.54 1.73 1.74 2.7 (RCP)
2008 7.59 6.67 2.47 1.81 2.0 (RCP)
2012a 7.3 6.88 2.53 2.55 3.2 (RCP)
2012b 5.28 4.95 3.16 2.95 3.2 (RCP)
2016a 3.91 5.72 1.59 1.59 3.9 (RCP)
2016b 5.99 6.17 3.64 3.63 3.9 (RCP)
The second property is quantified by the offset from the real difference between the
Democratic and Republican candidates (D-R), expressed in percentage points. Table 3
represents the real (D-R) differences for all election years, followed by the relative offsets
of each forecasting method from this difference. For example, in 1968, (D-R)=-0.7 and
the offset of PTA is -1.43 (we can infer that PTA estimated the (D-R) difference at
−0.7 + (−1.43) = −2.13 points). By averaging all forecasting offsets (in positive value)
over all datasets, we measure a total (D-R) offset of 1.95 points for the best pollster, 4.07
for CC and 3.59 for SA. TA outperforms again the other methods by scoring an average
offset of 1.74 for PTA and 1.91 for ETA.
Additionally, we investigate how many out of the 13 elections (1968–2016) are cor-
rectly predicted in terms of picking the right winning party. As such, the reference
statistical methods are the least performant, with CC predicting only 10 out of 13 pres-
idents, and SA predicting 11 out of 13. The best pollsters manage to predict 11 out of
13, while PTA and ETA predict 12 out of 13 winners. No method was able to predict
the correct 2016 winner. We did find one pollster which correctly predicted the winner of
those elections, but did so by a much greater error in terms of popular vote. Supporting
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Table 3: Column (D-R) represents the absolute percentage difference between the Democratic and Re-
publican candidates after election. All subsequent columns represent the relative offset of the forecasting
methods from the (D-R) difference. A smaller offset means a closer estimation of the winning party.
Dataset (D-R) CC SA PTA ETA Best
1968 -0.7 -6.12 -5.8 -1.43 -1.31 -1.3
1972 -23.2 -3.51 -3.52 0.24 -1.04 -0.8
1976 2.1 8.46 7.93 0.12 0.53 0.9
1980 -9.7 7.15 3.42 7.02 6.71 6.7
1984 -18.2 3.43 3.32 1.16 1.2 1.2
1988 -7.8 6.14 6.54 -0.14 -1.31 -0.2
1992 5.6 -6.52 -5.18 -1.06 1.24 3.4
1996 8.5 6.95 6.75 3.04 2.64 2.5
2000 0.5 -2.47 -2.49 -0.38 1.25 -2.4
2004 -2.4 1.12 0.58 1.73 1.56 0.9
2008 7.2 -3.07 -2.17 0.51 0.83 0.4
2012a 3.9 -1.36 -1.2 -2.53 -2.55 -3.2
2012b 3.9 -1.62 -1.73 -3.16 -2.95 -3.2
2016a 2.1 2.89 2.94 1.59 1.59 1.1
2016b 2.1 -0.27 -0.25 2 1.89 1.1
Average - 4.07 3.59 1.74 1.91 1.95
results for Tables 2, 3 are provided in Appendix E.
Furthermore, we highlight in Figure 4 the superior estimation performance of TA
compared to the state of the art. We underline the fact that our TA methods outper-
form the best pollster, in terms of estimation error ε, on 8 out of 15 datasets (PTA),
respectively 12 out of 15 datasets (ETA). Overall, TA outperforms the competing pre-
dictors in 10 out of 13 election years (77%). The upper panel in Figure 4 graphically
represents the ratio between the best pollster prediction error and the TA method pre-
diction error (i.e., εBest/εTA). As such, values (represented as columns) over 1.0 mean
a higher performance for our TA methods. The lower panel in Figure 4 classifies the
cases when our PTA or ETA methods outperform the best pollster prediction (i.e., with
green, otherwise red), for each election dataset. Also, we represent the cases when any of
the three methods compared manage to forecast the correct winner of the elections. The
only notable difference is that the best pollster does not succeed to forecast the winning
party in the 2000 elections.
4.1. Real time feasibility analysis
We extend our analysis by exploring the feasibility of our theoretical framework in
the context of application during a real time pre-election period. Thus, we use the 2016a
(RCP) dataset and compare the prediction errors ε at different points in time. The
dataset consists of 259 polls over a 529 day period prior to the elections. We choose ar-
bitrarily to measure the predictions and corresponding ε at t = {100, 250, 400, 500, 529}.
Table 4 represents the estimation errors ε for all five forecasting methods (here the best
pollster is RCP), and the improvement ratio is εRCP /εETA. Values greater than 1 mean
higher performance for ETA. Detailed experimental results are given in Appendix B.
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Figure 4: Ratio between the best pollster prediction error and the PTA (violet), respectively, ETA
(yellow) prediction error. Values above 1 translate into higher prediction performance of our TA methods.
In the lower panel we highlight the cases when TA outperforms the best pollster (green, or red otherwise),
and the election years in which any of the three predictors manage to forecast the correct election winner.
Table 4: Estimation error ε of forecasting methods during the 2016 presidential pre-election period at
different moments in time (here, t=0: 2015/05/26 and t=529: 2016/11/08). In the last column, the
ratio between the RCP estimation error and the ETA error.
t CC SA PTA ETA RCP Ratio
100 9.88 10.41 3.82 3.69 6.7 1.81
250 5.16 6.94 6.95 7.32 2.8 0.38
400 6.95 7.82 6.6 6.55 10.2 1.55
500 4.83 6.72 4.58 4.57 4.8 1.05
529 3.91 5.72 1.59 1.59 3.9 2.45
We find that the prediction accuracy of the statistical methods (CC, SA) depends
mainly on the amount of data, as their forecasts slowly converge towards the real results.
Conversely, the other methods do not depend on the increasing amount of data (as we
get closer to the election day), but rather on the volatility of the socio-political context.
Namely, RCP has the highest fluctuations, registering jumps from a low ε = 2.8 (February
2016) to a very high ε = 10.2 (July 2016), then falling back to ε ≈ 4− 5 (October 2016).
Our TA methods register more stability than RCP, and are not influenced by the same
social volatility we measured in RCP. We note that the Democratic candidate gathered
increasing popularity until March 2016, so that TA reflects this by giving her a higher
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virtual chance of winning. Nevertheless, as the popularity of the Republican candidate
rapidly increased, during mid-spring and mid-summer 2016, our forecasting becomes
better leaning towards a balanced outcome that is closer to the final registered popular
vote.
We have found that, unlike the best pollsters, which rely on MRP corroborated
with social, economical and political trends, our TA method improves its forecasting
based solely on the time-aware convergence of public opinion, which can be considered
of significant estimation prowess [14, 38, 39].
5. Discussion
Our study differs in several respects from previous work on election forecasting. In
comparison to basic statistical approaches, like CC and SA, our TA needs additional
temporal information on each pre-election poll (i.e., date when a poll was made public).
Unlike simple averaging of the information, we feed the survey data to our simulation
framework which is highly influenced by the temporal aspect. Both PTA and ETA
methods model opinion momentum, in time, as a function which bounces up when opinion
is injected, and dampens down otherwise. This process resembles the way a capacitor
charges (i.e., opinion being injected) and discharges slowly (i.e., relaxation state, no
opinion injected). Compared to the state of the art methods, like MRP [15, 16, 17],
our TA does not need any demographic, economic, or political information related to
the context of the election. This distinction represents a significant advantage for TA
over MRP since our method may be applied, given enough reliable public polls, in any
political region of the world. Similar to the case study in this paper, we did not consider
any additional information about the USA during the 1968–2016 period.
In essence, the TA model is aimed at improving the prediction of the popular vote.
Nevertheless, we find studies especially tailored to systems like the US, which are based
on the college system [17, 16], and, conversely, tailored to systems utilizing a direct
popular vote, like France [11]. The work of [17, 16] manages to forecast US presidential,
senatorial, and gubernatorial elections at the state level by incorporating state level
demographics to better predict the college vote. However, we have developed the TA
forecasting model to be usable outside any political context, as long as there is sufficient
and reliable pre-election poll data. This choice may give it an apparent disadvantage in
the US system, but as our case study was intended to show, in practice TA still yields
superior performance. Moreover, where other models may need specific tuning to be used
in other countries of the world, TA will work without the need for customization.
In this study we start from the premises that the opinion injected in social networks,
stemming from publicly accredited opinion polls, has a very high media coverage. To this
end, recent studies on how US adults keep themselves informed about political candidates
and issues, show that TV (news) occupies the leading spot with 73%, followed by 45% for
news websites/apps, 24% for newspapers, and 21% specifically for social media. These
statistics are in favor of our premises since opinion injection from pollsters is practically
done through all the enumerated media types [40]. Furthermore, in terms of polling
reliability, current media types are diverse, but their combined coverage remains high,
including in the electoral context, and polling accuracy remains reliable [41].
Finally, as an explanation to why TA outperforms more complex data-driven meth-
ods used by pollsters (e.g., MRP), we notice that the forecasts of TA for the ”other”
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(O) candidates are lower, and implicitly closer, to the real results. Averaged over all
datasets, the pre-election surveys predict that 11.61% will vote for the O candidate; TA
predicts 6.94%, and the best pollster predicts 7.57%. However, following each election,
we compute the real average percentages for the O candidate at only 5.08%. This means
that, even though the forecasts for the D and R candidates may be realistic, the public
opinion polls are unable to distribute a difference of ≈ 6.5% of remaining votes. On the
other hand, the best pollsters are unable to distribute ≈ 2.5% of overall votes, and TA
only ≈ 1.8% of votes. This observation does not mean that TA simply overestimates the
percentages for the two main candidates; it means that TA is able to distribute the votes
for the O candidate more realistically based on the dynamics of expressing opinion just
before the end of the pre-election period, which usually sees an abrupt drop of ≈ 30%
in popularity for O (see an extended statistical analysis in Appendix C. Of course, these
performance gains of TA can be further analyzed in future research, and supported by
both social psychology or political science assumptions.
5.1. Limitations of the model
Our TA model brings some limitations along, which we further discuss. For instance,
we consider social media as an ubiquitous diffusion mechanism, but there are also, so
called, non-users. We added this form of simplification to our model due to difficulty in
acquiring data for offline users, and due to the reliability of that data. Official statistics
approximate that 3/4 of the US population are engaged in social media. Even in this
case, we argue that our model’s simplification remains robust, as a study on political
attitudes concludes that no statistically significant differences arise between social media
users and non-users on political attention, values or political behavior [42]
Another realistic simplification in our model allows us to consider the electoral system
relatively hard to shape from the outside, so that we do not have to account for data
beyond our reach (i.e., external influences). The liberal democracy index was developed
to measure the robustness of a political system, and, according to a study by the Swedish
V-Dem institute, the USA scores 0.75 (out of 1) and lies within the top 20% liberal nations
[43]. As such, we can consider the studied US electoral system as robust.
Existing vote polarization and poll credibility are also important topics to consider in
the future[44], however, our electoral forecasting model was designed to be, as much as
possible, unaffected by any social and political contexts, including the effects of opinion
polarization.
5.2. Conclusions
Driven by the increases in access to data and computational power, modern election
forecasting systems should, intuitively, evolve along one of two directions: a possible
microscopic framework built on extensively detailed social media data, or a possible
macroscopic framework employing complex data science techniques on demographics
and economic indices. However, our proposed model represents a trade-off between both
micro and macro worlds, and the result is a simple, intuitive and robust methodology
which can be applied on any pre-election data with temporal information. We argue
that this simplification is effective since social influence often pertains to the knowledge
of crowds [38]. In other words, the aggregated judgment of many individuals (macro-
scale) can be more accurate than the judgments of individual experts (micro-scale) [39].
This effect is significantly strengthened when applied on larger population sizes [38].
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Despite the apparently simplified assumptions behind TA, revolving around the idea
that we can apply a microscopic opinion interaction model to predict macroscopic be-
havior, our results pinpoint to the fact that time-awareness is more significant in poll
forecasting than previously considered. In our case study, TA outperforms state of the art
election forecasting methods in 10 out of the 13 presidential elections. TA accumulates
an average forecasting error of 2.87–3.28 points, while statistical methods accumulate
7.48 points error, and the best pollster estimations accumulate 3.64 points. This trans-
lates into a roughly 30% prediction improvement for our method, in terms of forecasting
accuracy of the popular vote.
Moreover, analyzing the methods of reputable institutions in the US, like the Huff-
ington Post, Real Clear Politics, or Five Thirty Eight, we have not seen any temporal
attenuation method that is similar to the one proposed in this paper. Other statistical,
or data science approaches (e.g., MRP) rely on specific social, economical, and political
contexts to improve and tune their predictions. Conversely our TA does not require socio-
economical contextual information, and we believe that this independence translates into
an advantage. It will probably never be possible to create the perfect forecasting system,
due to the complexity of elections, but our TA represents a novel and distinguishable
scientific proposal with proven high performance.
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